Abstract This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives is manipulable. The lower bound is derived and examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. It is conjectured that these social choice functions are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of these social choice functions are Pareto optimal, it follows that the lower bound also holds for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting.
Introduction
The well-known result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that any strategy-proof surjective social choice function for more than two alternatives is dictatorial. This implies that the combination of anonymity and unanimity is not compatible with strategy-proofness. In this paper we investigate, for the case of three alternatives, how incompatible these conditions are, i.e., how much manipulability anonymous and unanimous social choice functions minimally admit. There is a small literature on the degree of vulnerability to strategic behavior of classical social choice functions, such as Borda, Plurality, etc. The paper by Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) contains simulation and enumeration results on 26 different social choice functions for different indices of manipulability. Slinko (2002) counts the number of instable profiles of classical social choice functions, which is an upper bound for the number of manipulable profiles of these social choice functions. On the other hand, little is known about the extent of manipulability of social choice functions satisfying certain properties, in particular on lower bounds. A first investigation was carried out by Kelly (1988) , who found the minimal number of manipulable profiles for nondictatorial surjective social choice functions with three alternatives and two agents and also formulated several conjectures. This line of research was continued by Fristrup and Keiding (1998) , who determined the minimal number of manipulable profiles for two agents and any number of alternatives. Maus et al. (2004b) consider among other things the three alternative case and show that for any number of agents larger than two there are six minimally manipulable nondictatorial surjective social choice functions, and these are even anonymous. However, they also consider minimally manipulable unanimous and nondictatorial social choice functions. These turn out to be nondictatorial only in a minimal sense, namely at only one profile.
Here we exclude such social choice functions by demanding, besides unanimity, that agents are treated anonymously. (Maus et al. 2004a contains results for this case with surjectivity instead of unanimity.) We look for the minimal number of manipulations. It is well known that in case of two alternatives any monotonic social choice function is strategy-proof. As, in that case, monotonicity and anonymity are compatible (see e.g. May 1952), the minimal number of manipulations is zero. We consider the three alternatives case and show that for n agents the minimal number is 2 n − 2. Furthermore, we give examples of social choice functions reaching the lower bound and point out that some of these examples are Pareto optimal. Thus, 2 n − 2 is also the lower bound for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. We argue that status quo voting is an example of a Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice function which is minimally manipulable for three alternatives.
It should be noted that the way in which we measure manipulability, namely by counting manipulable profiles, is not the only possible one. There are many interesting variations, for example by taking the number of agents that can manipulate or the severity of the manipulations into account. The already mentioned paper by Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) contains an overview of such variations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions. Section 3 contains special results about the manipulability of two and three agent social choice functions that are used in the proof of the main result. The main result: any unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives and n agents has at least 2 n − 2 manipulable profiles, is proved in Sect. 4. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are presented in Sect. 5. Section 6, finally, considers Pareto optimality instead of unanimity.
